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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 06-1764
                              
ELIZABETH LIGGON-REDDING,
Appellant
v.
AMERICAN SECURITIES INSURANCE COMPANY;
NATIONAL CITY MORTGAGE COMPANY
                              
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-00227)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 9, 2008
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 15, 2008)
 
                              
OPINION
                              
2AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Elizabeth Liggon-Redding challenges the District Court’s dismissal of her
Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  We vacate the Court’s order and
remand the case for further proceedings.
Liggon-Redding alleges the following in her Complaint.  Her home was destroyed
in a fire, and her insurance company (American Securities Insurance Company, or
“American”), which had issued a policy in the amount of $149,000, determined that the
home could be repaired for $39,281.23.  Her mortgage company (National City
Mortgage, or “National”) agreed to accept the $39,281.23 payment in satisfaction of the
balance due on the mortgage.  American then determined that the home was a total loss
and issued two checks to compensate for the loss in the combined amount of $48,711.26. 
American, however, sent both checks to National rather than to Liggon-Redding. 
Alleging that American should have paid her because National had already accepted the
repair payment in total satisfaction of the mortgage, Liggon-Redding filed suit pro se in
the District Court, demanding (1) that National give her all amounts paid to it in excess of
the initial $39,281.23 payment and (2) that American give her the remainder owed to her
under her $149,000 policy (approximately $60,000 after the payments to the mortgage
company are deducted).
Before the Summons and Complaint were served on American and National, the
District Court dismissed the Complaint sua sponte for lack of diversity subject matter
jurisdiction.  It ruled that the Complaint contained two separate claims against two
     1 In her Complaint, Liggon-Redding listed herself as “homeless” (with a P.O. box in
New Jersey) she alleged that American is a resident of Florida and National is a resident
of Ohio. 
     2 We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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separate defendants and that neither of the amounts in controversy, on its own, exceeded
the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction.1  After
concluding that the amounts could not be aggregated, the District Court dismissed the
Complaint and did not grant leave to amend.  Liggon-Redding moved for reconsideration,
but the Court denied the motion.  Liggon-Redding then filed this appeal, in which neither
American nor National is participating as an appellee.2
A district court generally should not dismiss a suit prior to service of process.  See
Urbano v. Calissi, 353 F.2d 196, 197 (3d Cir. 1965).  Moreover, it should generally
permit amendment of a complaint that is vulnerable to dismissal where a responsive
pleading has not been filed.  See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2004).  
We perceive no exception to these general rules that would apply here.  We cannot
conclude that what the District Court did was “harmless,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 61
(providing that a harmless error will not provide a ground for disturbing a court order), or
that amendment of the Complaint would be “futile,” see Alston, 363 F.3d at 235 (listing
futility as a ground for refusing to grant leave to amend).  Without expressing an opinion
on whether the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction (or could have jurisdiction
were the Complaint phrased differently), we note that Liggon-Redding has a colorable
argument that it does.  There is a dearth of case law in our Court on aggregation of claims
4against multiple defendants, and in any event Liggon-Redding claims to have suffered
well over $75,000 in damages as a result of underpayments to her and diversion of
proceeds to National—damages that one could conceivably attribute to a single defendant
in this case.
Accordingly, we vacate the District Court’s order and remand the case for further
proceedings.  The Court should direct Liggon-Redding to amend her Complaint to state
her claims against each defendant with precision, after which the Complaint and
Summons should be served on each defendant.  Finally, we emphasize that nothing in this
opinion should be read to preclude either National or American from moving to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or any other reason.
